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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,

;

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

]
])

EDWARD JOSEPH GALLAGHER,

;

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040375

]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 as Amended).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying
the Defendant/Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence accumulated by the
investigating officer, on the grounds that it was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. In reviewing this issue, the Utah Appellate Court has determined that:
[t]he factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential
clearly-erroneous standard, but the legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's
application of the legal standard to the facts.
State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Patefiekt 927 P.2d
655, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The appellate court's review of the conclusions reached
1

by the trial court is based upon the "totality of those facts..." standard. IcL; State v.
Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The Appellant, however, contends that inasmuch as all the testimony introduced at
the suppression hearing in this matter was proffered, stipulated testimony, the trial court
was not required to weigh the evidence or determine issues relating to the credibility of
the witnesses. Accordingly, the Appellant submits that the factual findings of the trial
court should be given no deference in these proceedings (R. 152-168).
This Court has held that a finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate
evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White, 799
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Stated another way, factual findings are clearly
erroneous if they are "against the clear weight of evidence, or the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987).
The propriety of the trial court's denial of the Defendant/Appellant's motion to
suppress was properly preserved for appeal in the trial court. Defendant/Appellant filed
his motion to suppress on May 12, 2003 (R. 13-24). The City filed its response on July
3, 2003 (R. 25-39). The trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendant's motion to
suppress on April 1, 2003 (R. 159-168), and signed its Findings and an Order on July 28,
2003, denying the Defendant/Appellant's motion to suppress (R. 40-47). A bench trial
was held on March 29, 2004 (R. 62-63), and the Defendant was found guilty and
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sentenced on April 14, 2004 (R. 64-66). A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on May 10,
2004 (R. 68-69).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative constitutional provisions in this matter include the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probeible cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal matter in which the City of Orem charged the Defendant with
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44
(1953 as Amended), as adopted by Orem City ordinance. The violation was alleged to
have occurred on November 27, 2002 (R.166). After the trial court denied the
Defendant/Appellant's motion to suppress, the matter was set for a bench trial on March
29, 2004. At that time, the Defendant was found guilty. The Defendant was sentenced
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:0045 and the Notice of Appeal was filed in this matter on May 103 2004
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The transcript from the April

- - suppression lie ai iiig, totaling six and < im

half (IJ I < ?) pages nl .nlu il festiiitoin, i iKarln; J hetvU . us E x h i b i t ' 1 " to the A d d e n d u m
159-68). A s indicated above, all the testimony received b y the trial court at the
suppression hearing was proffered, stipulated testimony which eliminated the need for
the trial court to weigh conflicting testimony or evaluate tin < lulilnlih nil tin " ilncsses.
A siiiiiiiiiii'v n t ' l l k ' fiiiiitfniN'il, ":(i|»iitiled I r s d mm \ ii as follows:
1.

O n November 27, 2002, Mr. Medina, an electrician, employed by Utah

Valley State College, was driving his vehicle and was following a car that was on
Geneva R o a d i e u • vicinity u I ! N)(» Soulli in < hem, I Hah < W !'•'« lines I / ," I, l«' l<»4,
1
2.

A s Mr. Medina was traveling, the vehicle h e was following turned South

on Sandhill road and Mr. Medina continued to follow him. M r Medina, w h o had been
to the police academy, noticed that the \ clinic in ""i"

I '• >» \,i r\ ulni. iiif1 ,i t J, i \ mi-

pattern Specifically ]\ Ii IN 1 < >< lit u ;i i n iticed that the vehicle touched the opposite travel
lanes three times (R.166 line 21 iu K I <>>, iin* !).
3.

The driving pattern observed by Mi, Medina led him to believe that the

driver might be unac

*

r9

^ l e d i i ii K :( n ...tli n iedfc: > fc »llc r * > 1 1 n : v< chicle Mr. Medina noted that the vehicle continued u p
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Sandhill Road in Orem, Utah County, Utah, and finally pulled in front of a residence (R.
165, lines 1 to 5).
4.

Mr. Medina noted that the vehicle was a souped up Mustang 5.0. When

Mr. Medina caught up to the vehicle at the residence, the person driving it was already
out of the vehicle. The person appeared to be wearing shorts, was tall and went into the
residence (R. 165, lines 6 to 10).
5.

Mr. Medina called in a report to the police. The make of the vehicle and

the license plate he called in was a Mustang with Utah license plate 858XYL. In
addition, Mr. Medina reported his position as 2000 North Geneva Road, instead of 2000
North Sandhill Road, where he was actually located (R. 165, lines 13 to 22).
6.

Officer Warenski, who was the arresting officer, had his testimony

proffered also. Orem City dispatch had sent out a call on a green Ford Mustang.
Dispatch did not list a plate number and did not list any particular part of Orem where the
vehicle was seen. As the officer was driving Eastbound on 1200 or 1300 South
University Parkway, at approximately 12:46a.m. (a little after midnight), on November
28, 2002, the officer noticed a green Mustang that was parked in an area "quite a ways
out," in the north parking lot of the Outback Steakhouse (R. 163, line 17 to R. 162, line
3; R. 161, lines 4 to 10). The plate number on the Defendant's vehicle was entirely
dissimilar to that given by Mr. Medina to Dispatch; it was 795LZN (R. 161, lines 14 to
24).

5

7

< > H n - cr Warenski pulled behind the Defendant's vehicle, blocking it so that

it could not back out. The Defendant could however, have pulled forward (R. 162, line
23 to page 161, line 13). The officer turned his spotlight, illuminating the rear of the
Defendant's vehicle, got <
window I (he Defendant's vehicle, where the Defendant, Mr. Gallagher, was seated.
When the officer approached the side window, Mr. Gallagher rolled his window down.
The officer smelled the odor of alcohol and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle
to do field sobi iet> tests (R 162. line s 5 to 11)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant/Defendant submits that the trial court erred in initially determining that
the actions of the officer constituted a Level I, as opposed to a Level II, encounter with
theDi

•

.

•

•

i

'

applicable to Level I encounter between law enforcement officers and citizens, instead of
the standard applicable to Level II encounters.
The Appellant contends that the initial actions of the Orem City police officer, in

constituted a seizure under the relevant provisions of both the United States and Utah
Constitutions and the case law interpreting those provisions.
Further, the facts supported by the proffered testimony in this case support a

6

Utah Appellate Courts. In that regard, the Appellant contends that many of the facts
relied upon by the trial court in its Findings and Order to support a Level I encounter is
simply not supported by the stipulated, proffered testimony at the suppression hearing. If
the trial court had stayed within the facts actually supported by the evidence, Appellant
submits that the trial court would have been compelled to find a level II encounter.
Having determined that the stipulated, proffered testimony support the conclusion
that the encounter between the officer and the Defendant was a level II encounter, the
Appellant submits that the City then has the burden of demonstrating that the officer had
a "reasonable suspicion" before commencing the process of a level II encounter.
Appellant argues that the facts of this case demonstrate that the information transmitted
to the officer by the third party citizen through Orem City dispatch fell substantially short
of providing "reasonable suspicion" for stopping the Defendant, as that term has been
defined in similar circumstances by this Court.
Lastly, the Appellant contends that based upon the lack of "reasonable suspicion,"
the fruits of the level II encounter must be suppressed, and this Court should reverse and
remand this case, with instructions to the trial court to vacate the judgment in this case
and dismiss the matter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or is
7

induced by an erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is the Appellant's
position that a substantial portion of the trial court's findings in this case are clearly
erroneous based upon a total lack of evidentiary support.
Appellant has attached hereto as Exhibit "2" to the Addendum, the "Findings and
Order on Objection to Motion to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence," signed by
Judge John C. Backlund, on July 28, 2003. The document was prepared by counsel for
the Appellee using language taken directly from Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to
the Defendant's motion to suppress.
After the suppression hearing on April 1, 2003, the Defendant filed his motion to
suppress with supporting memorandum on May 12, 2003 (R. 13-24). The Plaintiff filed a
responsive pleading on July 3, 2003, nearly two months later (R. 25-39).
Unfortunately, the trial court failed thereafter, to enter any findings from the
suppression hearing, make any minute entries or give counsel for Plaintiff any directions
in fashioning the Order. In fact, the Record is devoid of any reference to a ruling on the
Defendant's motion other than the filing of an Order prepared by counsel for the
Plaintiff, denying the Dependant's motion. Unfortunately, a majority of the facts included
in the Order are directly from the City's memorandum in opposition to the Defendant's
motion to suppress, and have no basis in the facts adduced at the suppression hearing or
anywhere in the Record of this case.

8

For the Court's convenience, the individual factual findings from the trial court's
Order are set out verbatim and then Appellant notes whether the factual basis for the same
is contested.
1.

On or about November, 28, 2002, at about 23:30 hours, Officer
Warenski was on routine patrol when he dispatched [sic] of a
possible green, Ford Mustang traveling eastbound on University Parkway
in Orem, Utah.

Findings and Order, para. 1.
The only testimony relating to the officer's actions was that Orem City dispatch
had sent out a call on a Ford Mustang. There is no record as to what the call on the Ford
Mustang was for and no indication that any of the information possessed by Mr. Medina
was transmitted by Dispatch including the fact that the driver of the vehicle might be
under the influence. Dispatch did not list a plate number and did not list any particular
part of Orem. As Officer Warenski was driving Eastbound on 1200 or 1300 South
University Parkway, he spotted the Defendant's vehicle, a green Mustang (R. 163, line 17
to R.162, line 3). All other extraneous information including the statement that dispatch
identified a particular area where the suspicious vehicle might be located, as contained in
Finding No. 1, has no foundation in the record. Importantly, there is no evidence as to
whether Mr. Medina identified a color of the vehicle when he called in the matter to
police and whether the color was correctly transmitted to officers by dispatch. As noted
above, the license plate number given by Mr. Medina was totally misconstrued by
dispatch officers.
9

2.

Officer Warenski was traveling east on University Parkway and had
past [sic] State Street. He was unable to locate the vehicle while he
traveled to 800 East University Parkway. He circled around and
headed back west on University Parkway.

Findings and Order, para. 2.
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of Finding No. 2.
3.

Officer Warenski, crossed State Street and then observed a Green
Ford Mustang parked in the norther part of Outback Steakhouse,
located at 372 East University Avenue.

Findings and Order, para. 3.
There is no evidence of specifically how the officer got to the location where the
Defendant was located (the Outback Steakhouse), but the rest of the finding is consistent
with the evidence (Tr. p. 6, line 17 to p. 7, line 3).
4.

Officer Warenski advised dispatch he located a green, Ford Mustang
that matched the description and entered the parking lot of the
Outback Steakhouse.

Findings and Order, para. 4.
There is no evidence to support any discussion between the officer and dispatch.
Further, aside from matching a description of a Ford Mustang, there is no evidence that
the "green" color was a match with what Mr. Medina saw or not.
5.

Officer Warenski pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his
"take down lights" and shined it toward the vehicle for officer
safety reasons.

Findings and Order, para. 5.
The record is clear that the officer pulled behind the Defendant's vehicle, blocking
10

it so that it could not back out (R. 162, line 23 to R. 161, line 13). The officer then turned
his spotlight on the rear of the Defendant's vehicle (R.162, line 5 to 11). There is
absolutely no mention of "take down" lights and certainly no mention of "officer safety"
considerations.
6.

Officer Warenski approached the vehicle and observed a male
subject roll down his drives [sic] side window.

Findings and Order, para. 6.
The Appellant acknowledges that the evidence is that, when the officer got up to
the side window, Mr. Gallagher rolled his window down for the officer.
7.

Officer Warenski leaned over and immediately smelled an odor of
alcohol emanating from the vehicle.

Findings and Order, para. 7.
Again, the finding is an embellishment of the record. The evidence is that when
the window was rolled down the officer smelled the odor of alcohol (R. 162, line 5 to 11).
8.

The Officer then asked for the driver's drivers license, and he
produced a California drivers license that identified the male subject
as Edward Joseph Gallagher.

Findings and Order, para. 8.
Although it is obvious that the driver was the Defendant, there is no evidence to
support the rest of the finding and again it illustrates the lack of connection between the
suppression hearing and the findings of the trial court.
9.

Officer Warenski related to Mr. Gallagher he was checking
on him due to a recent report of a green, Ford Mustang
11

that was possibly driving under the influence.
Findings and Order, para. 9.
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding.
10.

Mr. Gallagher indicated to Officer Warenski he had consumed
three or four beers about a half hour ago at the Outback Steakhouse.

Findings and Order, para. 10.
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding.
11.

Officer Warenski noted Mr. Gallagher's vehicle was running
and observed the interior gauges to be turned on.

Findings and Order, para. 11.
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding.
12.

Officer Warenski requested Mr. Gallagher to submit to submit
to field sobriety test, which he filed, and ultimately blew
a .193 B.A.C. on an intoxilizer. Mr. Gallagher was arrested
for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol.

Findings and Order, para. 12.
There is no evidence in the record to support any portion of this Finding.
The Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should determine the challenged
factual findings are clearly erroneous and exclude them from its consideration of the
propriety of the trial court's conclusions of law and order in this matter, denying the
Appellant's motion to suppress.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT
THE SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTED A LEVEL I STOP.

12

A.

The Detention of the Defendant by the Officer Constituted a Seizure
Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution*

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
search and seizures." A similar right is contained in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. It follows that "people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection
when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalk." Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S.
648, 663 (1970) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has 'seized* that person." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. A person is deemed seized
"even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648.
In State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals
recognized that the action of an officer in parking a police vehicle in a manner that blocks
a citizen's vehicle constitutes a seizure under the constitutional provisions cited above. IdL
at 882. See also, Struhs 940 P.2d at 1227.
There appears to be no contest in this matter that a seizure of the Defendant took
place. The contested issues begin with the categorization of the level of that encounter or
seizure (R. 37-35).
B.

The Encounter Between the Defendant and the Officer was a
Level II Encounter.
13

The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the encounter
between the Defendant and the officer constituted a level one, instead of a level two
encounter.
Utah courts have recognized that there are three levels of "constitutionally
permissible encounters between police officers and the public." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be
temporary and last no longer that is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
Id (quoting State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)); see also United States
vJMerritt,736F.2d223,230(5thCir. 1984).
As noted by the Court in State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225,1227 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), the distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual encounter) and
a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion) depends on whether,
through a show of physical force or authority, a person believes his freedom of movement
is restrained. See also United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). The test in
determining what level of an encounter occurred is an objective test that takes into
consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident. Struhs, 940 P.2d at
1227.

14

The Utah Appellate Courts have decided two cases relating to the analysis that
should apply to situations where the instrumentality used to detain a citizen comprised the
use, in part, of the officer's vehicle.
1.

State v. Struhs

In State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the defendant appealed the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. In that case, a deputy paramedic patrolling
with her partner, observed the defendant's pickup traveling toward a construction area.
She observed the defendant back his vehicle toward some barricades and a sign that read
"Road Closed." Id Once there, the defendant turned off his head lights, and the deputy
never saw anyone leave the vehicle. The deputy knew the truck was parked in close
proximity to an area where a number of construction vehicles and equipment were
located. Id.
The officer was concerned about the fact that there had been numerous complaints
of thefts in that area and accordingly proceeded to turn off all the lights on her vehicle and
park approximately a car length-and-a-half in front of the defendant's truck, described as
"nose-to-nose." IcL The officer then activated her "takedown" lights, located on the light
bar on top of the vehicle, but did not activate her red and blue flashing lights. The
officers then approached the vehicle and saw numerous syringes, spoons, and lighters.
The syringe was later determined to contain cocaine. IcL
As in this case, the defendant contended that the stop was a level two encounter

15

which was not supported by reasonable suspicion. In starting its analysis using the totality
of the circumstances, the Court started with the location of the officer's vehicle:
Defendant claims that the officer's action of parking nose-to-nose about
one car length away when his car was backed up against a barricade
essentially "blocked defendant in" so he was unable to move. While
defendant was not completely blocked in, the officer's positioning of
her vehicle is certainly a factor that weighs in favor of finding under a
totality of circumstances that defendant was seized.
Id at 1227-28.
Secondly, the Court in Struhs noted,
Equally important in our analysis is the officer's stealthy approach to defendant
and her sudden activation of her headlights and white take-down lights. In State v.
Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court determined that no seizure
occurred when an officer drove up and merely stopped behind a parked car on the
side of a road. See id. at 12. However, the court did conclude that after the officer
had seen a beer on top of the car and a man urinating next to the car, the officer
had seized the driver when he activated his overhead lights. See id. (Emphasis in
original)
Id. at 1228 (emphasis added).
Based upon the analysis of how the officer positioned her vehicle and the means by
which she approached the defendant's vehicle, the Court continued:
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was
seized. The time of night, the isolation of the location, the confrontational
approach made by the officer, the officer parking nose-to-nose with
defendant's vehicle, and the officer's sudden activation of her high-beam
headlights and white take-down lights, support our conclusion. Therefore,
for this level two encounter to be constitutional, it must be supported
by reasonable suspicion.
Id. (emphasis added).

16

2.

State v. Justesen

After its decision in Struhs. the Court had an opportunity to revisit the issue again
in State v. Justesen. 47 P.3d 936 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). In that case, the trial court had
found the encounter between the defendant and the officer to be a level two encounter and
granted the motion to suppress and the State appealed.
In Justesen, a Deputy Carbon County Sheriff was on routine patrol of a desolate
stretch of Airport Road one mile east of the airport when he came upon a Ford minivan.
The minivan had no lights on and the deputy could not tell if the van was broken down,
abandoned, or if the occupants of the minivan, assuming there were occupants, needed
assistance. Ld. at 937. The officer pulled off the road and, with only his headlights,
stopped six to eight feet behind the minivan. The only illumination in the area came from
the officer's headlights. Accordingly, after stopping his vehicle, the officer activated his
"take-down lights" (the two white spot lights located on the light bar on top of the patrol
vehicle) to "illuminate the area" for safety reasons. IcL The officer did not activate his
highbeams nor his red and blue flashing lights located on the light bar. Id.
The officer exited his vehicle and approached the rndnivan. The minivan's brake
lights illuminated as he proceeded to the driver's side of the minivan. As he continued
toward the front of the minivan, the officer saw the driver in the driver's seat with the
keys in the ignition, but the vehicle was not running. The officer then asked the driver for
identification and smelled the odor of alcohol. The driver admitted to drinking, was asked
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to do field sobriety tests that he failed and was then arrested. Id.
The Court surmised that the trial court's decision was probably influenced by the
decision in Struhs. Id. at 938-939. The Court then set out to identify the differences in the
facts that justified a finding of a level two encounter in Struhs and a level one in Justesen.
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[In Struhs], [w]e reversed the trial court, concluding that under the totality of
circumstances [the] defendant was seized. The time of night, the isolation of the
location, the confrontational approach made by the officer, the officer parking
nose-to-nose with [the] defendant's vehicle, and the officer's sudden activation of
her high-beam headlights and white take-down lights, support our conclusion. Id
at 1227, (emphasis added).
14 at 938.
The Court in Justesen then summarized the facts in the case before it.
In the present matter, the totality of circumstances surrounding the
encounter between Stefanoff [officer] and Justesen does not support a level two
stop. Although the encounter occurred at night in an isolated area, the factual
similarities between the present matter and Struhs ends there. The confrontational
and stealthy factors, present in Struhs are not present in this case. Stefanoff did not
approach Justesen's vehicle in a stealthy manner, and was not trying to surprise the
occupants, nor was he trying to "catch" them at something. Further, Stefanoff had
not observed the minivan for a prolonged period of time under the cloak of
darkness, only then becoming suspicious of the occupants' pattern of activities...
Instead, Stefanoff came upon the minivan while on patrol, and, with his headlights
on, approached Justesen's minivan. Stefanoff did not park "nose-to-nose" with
Justesen vehicle, but parked behind it. At that time, Stefanoff activated his takedown lights. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Stefanoff used the
take-down lights not as a show of authority, but to illuminate the area. In sum, we
view this encounter as no different than an officer pulling behind a vehicle parked
on the side of the road in the daylight hours. In both instances, the encounters are
voluntary and the motorist is free to leave, [citing authority]. To decide otherwise
would force an officer to choose between personal safety, in this case by simply
illuminating the area, or not stopping to render assistance to a stranded motorist in
18

an isolated area at night.
Id at 939.
3.

Comparison of Struhs and Justesen to the facts of this case.

It is important to note, as demonstrated in Point I above, that the trial court found
that the actions of the officer in this case demonstrated a sufficient showing of authority to
constitute a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment (Conclusion of Law Nos. 1 and 2 of
Findings and Order, Addendum, Exhibit "2"). The only question remaining for this
Court's determination is whether that seizure was a level one or level two detention. In
Justesen, the latest of the two decisions, the Utah Court of Appeals, noted the factors that
justified the finding of a level II encounter in Struhs as follows.
First, the Court found significance in the lateness of the hour. Justesen, 47 P.3d at
938. As in Struhs, the encounter in this case took place late at night, forty-six minutes
after midnight to be precise.
Second, the Court identified the isolation of the area. Id. Appellant asserts that this
factor is important in order to distinguish a casual encounter between an officer and a
citizen that is circulating among a general population and an encounter where it can fairly
be said that the officer singled the suspect out and made a point to make contact with that
particular individual. That explanation certainly fits the cases relied upon by this Court in
this area. In this case, the Defendant's vehicle was parked at the northern edge of a large
parking area. There is no testimony of any other vehicle that was in close proximity to the
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Defendant's vehicle when the officer made his approach. Further, we know that the
officer was focused on the Defendant because he was occupying the Ford Mustang that
somewhat matched the vehicle described in the dispatch.
Third, the Court in Justesen emphasized "the confrontational approach made by the
officer parking nose-to nose with [the] defendant vehicle...." WL In this case, the
officer's actions were precisely the same. The officer, after aggressively searching the
streets for the souped up Ford Mustang, identified a vehicle that matched at least the
"Ford" and "Mustang" part of the dispatch, and the officer, in an effort to confront the
suspect, pulled behind the Defendant in a confrontational manner, singling the Defendant
out and turned his "take-down" lights on for one purpose only - to demonstrate and exert
his authority to control the situation. As demonstrated in Struhs and Justesen, there is not
a requirement that the officer leave the suspect with no avenue of escape, but only that the
approach be such as to be confrontational and directed to confront the individual. In
Struhs. the deputy had observed the vehicle for a period of time, then approached the
vehicle and activated her "take-down" lights, to surprise the occupants and catch them at
whatever they were doing. In this case, the officer approached hoping to apprehend the
Defendant before he drove again.
It is respectfully submitted that the facts of this case match the aggravating factors
identified by this Court mandating a finding of a level II encounter.
Appellant asserts that it is equally important to compare the facts of this case with
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the elements identified in Justesen that the Court found did not justify a level II finding.
First, the Court found that in Justesea the approach of the officer was not stealthy.
The Court pointed out that the officer was not trying to surprise anyone or catch them at
anything. Instead, the officer had come upon the minivan during the regular course of
patrol and with only his headlights, approached the minivan. The officer did not park in a
confrontational manner but parked as a normal motorist would park if helping another
motorist along a roadway. The Court found that the officer only activated his "takedown" lights to illuminate the area and not as a show of authority. The evidence in that
case was that the only light in the area was the light from the officer's headlights. The
issue of officer safety was explicitly addressed in the evidence in that case.
In this case, none of those factors apply. The officer did not approach the
Defendant's vehicle while on regular patrol with an honest belief that the vehicle may
have been stalled, abandoned or that the occupants might be in trouble. Id. at 939. The
officer did not approach the vehicle in a courteous way, and certainly, there was not one
iota of evidence that the officer needed take-down lights to illuminate a parking area in a
mall parking lot for his safety.
Secondly, and most important, it was clear in this case that, as soon as the officer
approached the Defendant's vehicle, the Defendant was not free to leave. If the
Defendant had started his vehicle and proceeded down the street, the officer would have
initiated a traffic stop. It is clear that the officer was proceeding on the basis that he had
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reasonable suspicion based upon the information communicated by dispatch. It is
respectfully submitted that is the dispositive finding in this case. In comparison, if, when
the officer in Justesen was pulling off the road, the motorist had started his vehicle and
pulled onto the road, the officer may have followed the vehicle but would have waited for
a driving pattern or other violation to initiate a traffic stop. That is why, it is respectfully
submitted, that this Court has put such prominence on the factors that suggest that the
approach of the officer predetermined that there was going to be an interrogation and/or
field tests and/or search and not a casual conversation.
Based upon the analysis contained in Struhs and Justesea it is respectfully
submitted that the only finding that is consistent with the law enunciated by this Court is
that the facts of this case constitute a level II encounter.
POINT III: THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION
BEFORE INITIATING THE LEVEL II ENCOUNTER WITH THE DEFENDANT.
Before an officer can legally make a level II encounter, the officer must "point to
specific, articulable facts, which together with reasonable inference drawn from the facts,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about
to commit a crime." State v. Struhs, 940 P. 2d 1225, 1228 (1197) (quoting State v.
Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
The Utah Court of Appeals examined the issue relating to information coming
from an informant in Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In
that case, the informant called police and reported that a "drunk individual" had been at
22
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his front door and had driven away in a white car, a Toyota Celica, and had driven out of
his subdivision going east toward the mountains. The officer made a traffic stop based
upon the information provided. The Court held that an officer can rely on a dispatched
report if there was adequate articulable suspicion that spurred the dispatch. IcL at 234.
The Court held that to undertake the task, the Court had an obligation of probing the
reliability of the informant's tip. The first factor is the type of tip or informant involved.
The Court noted that anonymous tips are at the "low-end of the reliability scale." State v.
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court held that citizen informants
rank high on the reliability scale because such people ordinarily volunteer information
based upon concern for the community and can be held accountable civilly or criminally, if
the report is false. Id, at 20; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The second factor to be examined is whether the "informant gave enough detail
about the observed criminal activity to support a stop." KL, at 20; State v. Roth, 827 P.2d
255,257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court noted:
A tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the details
personally, instead of simply relaying information from a third party.
Id., at 20. The Court noted that there must be no hint of fabrication. Id.
The third factor identified by the Court is whether the police officer's personal
observations confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip. IcL The Court held that,
if the facts relating to the identity of the vehicle, the direction of travel and other details are
confirmed, it is not necessary that the officer corroborate the intoxication. However, the
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Court noted that such a test applies in circumstances where the alleged intoxicated driver is
on the roads, potentially subjecting the public to harm. The Court noted:
We therefore must consider the ever-changing equation used to balance the rights of
an individual to be free from unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of
movement and the right to privacy with the right of the public to be protected from
unreasonable danger. This equation and the balance change with the facts presented.
Id, at 20.
Applying the facts to the law, the Court found in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, that
there was a sufficient basis for the stop.
Applying the three factors to the facts of this case, it is submitted that the officer did
not have a reasonable suspicion. First, Appellant acknowledges that the elements of the
first factor are met in this case. Mr. Medina is an identifiable source of information as
opposed to an anonymous tip. Therefore, the information that can be attributed to Mr.
Medina comes with a higher degree of reliability. Further, there is no question that an
identified citizen, Mr. Medina, personally witnessed the events. See Mulcahy. 943 P.2d at
235-36.
It is with the second factor that the information stream relied upon by the officer in
this case starts to unravel. The second factor is intended to determine whether the
informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop. We
know that Mr. Medina observed a green souped up 5.0 Ford Mustang on November 27,
2002, traveling along 1200 South in Orem, Utah County, Utah. We know that Mr. Medina
saw that vehicle, as he was following it, touch the opposite travel lane three times leading
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him to believe that the person driving may be a DUI, a tired driver or a diabetic. It is
acknowledged that Mr. Medina lost sight of the vehicle and when he caught up to the car
again, it was parked at a residence, the driver was out of the vehicle and was entering a
residence.
Importantly, the second factor is not centered on what the informant knew, but
what details he gave that were relied upon by law enforcement personnel. The only
person, whose testimony was taken or proffered at the hearing was that of Officer
Warenski. No one from Orem City Dispatch testified. There is a reference to a Dispatch
Memo indicating that a call was on a green Ford Mustang and it had a specific plate number
(R. 163, lines 17-19). The license plate referenced on the Dispatch Memo was 858 XYL
when the actual license plate on the Defendant's vehicle was 795 LZN (R. 165, lines 13-14;
163, lines 17-19; 161, lines 14-23). However, the Dispatch Memo was never introduced
and no one testified from Orem City as to what Mr. Medina told them when he called and
importantly, what information was transmitted to Officer Warenski.
It is undisputed, according to Officer Warenski, that when the information got to
him, all he got was a "call" for a green Ford Mustang and it did not have a specific plate
number (R. 163, lines 17-25). The information stated the driver was east bound on
University Parkway in Orem (R. 162-3). Officer Warenski was not even advised that the
reason the call was out for the Ford Mustang was because of a possible DUI and,
further, was not advised as to the observations made by Mr. Medina.
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One of the prerequisites of the second factor is that the informant must give enough
detail to support the stop. kL The Record in this case, as it relates to what was given to the
officer does not even purport to provide a basis for any kind of stop. When the only
evidence in the Record is that there is a general "call" on a Ford Mustang in an area of
"Orem," what conceivable reasonable suspicion could arise in an officer's mind. He has
not been provided with any background. He does not know what the citizen observed with
regard to the vehicle or driver. He does not know what criminal conduct the person in the
Ford Mustang might be engaged in, and critically, he does not have enough detail to replace
the normal requirement placed on an officer to accumulate information supporting a
reasonable suspicion himself before initiating a level II stop.
Incredibly, the only evidence in the case, is that the license plate number that might
have made it through from Mr. Medina to Dispatch and then to Officer Warenski,
established the Defendant's vehicle was not the same vehicle Mr. Medina had been
following. As such, it is submitted that there is no basis upon which the second
requirement of Kavsville City v. Mulcahy. could be met with the Record in this case.
The requirements of the third factor also fail because Officer Warenski did not
observe any criminal activity or details sufficient enough to substantiate the information
provided by the informant. Absent a risk to public safety, police officers are expected to
make a significant independent corroborative effort to confirm an informant's information.
Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 236 (citing Roth, 827 P.2d at 258). In the case at hand, Officer
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Warenski observed the Defendant commit no act that could be construed as criminal
activity before he made the seizure. The Mulcahy Court found that reasonable articulable
suspicion is established if the officer confirms the facts relating to the identity of the
vehicle, the direction of travel and other details. Id. at 238.
As outlined above, the officer was not given any details of the informant's
observations and therefore had nothing to confirm. Objectively, we know from vague
references in the Record that Mr. Medina described the vehicle as being a green Ford
Mustang with a license plate 858 XYL parked in the area of Sand Hill Road in West Orem.
When Officer Warenski found the Defendant's vehicle, it was located a good distance from
West Orem. This detail alone may not establish that the Defendant was not the person Mr.
Medina allegedly saw; however, the total lack of similarity between the license plates does.
Officer Warenski pulled behind the defendant's vehicle. He had every opportunity to check
the Defendant's license plate before activating his "take-down" lights and approaching the
defendant's vehicle. Had the officer checked the license plate, he would have found that
the Defendant's license plate number was 795 LZN, not 858 XYL, as reported by Mr.
Medina, who had followed the driver of the Mustang for a long period of time and was an
individual trained at the police academy. By simply corroborating the license plate
number, the officer would have known that, first, the Defendant's vehicle was not the one
reported as a possible DUI by the informant and that, second, he did not have reasonable
suspicion to initiate a level II police-citizen encounter.
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It is important to keep in mind the evil that the procedure outlined above is meant to
protect us against:
If such a factual foundation were not required, it would be possible to validate
bogus information or secure action based only on police hunches simply by
sending information through police channels. Such information-laundering
legerdemain is simply not countenanced under the Fourth Amendment
(Emphasis added.)
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,1278 n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The logic of the Court of Appeals is clear. An officer upon seeing an individual
cannot stop that individual on the mere hunch that the person may have violated the law.
The officer must actually be in a position to conclude reasonably that a public offense was
committed. To do so, the officer must be aware, through his senses, of facts supporting the
conclusion.
If an officer could stop an individual based only on legal conclusions of a citizen,
without the need of specific need of factual detail supporting legal conclusion, a large gap
would be created in the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. In reality, officers
would phone in their own nonspecific information, to justify stops.
It is equally important to note that the officer in this case cannot justify his stop by
the odor of alcohol that came after he approached the Defendant. It is the Appellants
position that after-acquired information cannot be used to justify the initial stop.
The issue was clearly adjudicated in State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App.
1988). In that case, the officer observed the Defendant's vehicle which had Arizona plates
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both front and rear. The officer concluded that the sticker on the rear license plate did not
appear to be valid. The officer later testified that "something just struck me funny about it."
The officer was unaware of the Arizona color scheme for determining sticker validity. I d
at 1215. The officer followed the vehicle for a mile and determined the sticker was valid
through December but could not tell which year. The officer stopped the vehicle to
determine the sticker's validity. Id.
After making the stop and approaching the vehicle, the officer determined the sticker
was valid. After interrogating the defendant, the officer determined that the defendant's
driver's license was suspended. The officer arrested the defendant, impounded the vehicle
and as a result of an inventory search found 165 lbs. of marijuana in the trunk. Id_ at 1216.
In holding that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was illegal, the Court stated:
In the instant case the officer articulated "something just struck me funny about it"
referring to the license plate sticker. Alone this does not approach reasonable and
articulable suspicion. (If this is sufficient reason to stop, every out-of-state vehicle
may be stopped for no reason other than the officer's ignorance of the license plate
sticker color code.).
I d . at 1217, n. 1.
The Court then held that the officer's observations after the stop of new tires and
shocks, a twisted-off gas cap, the jack in the back seat, the defendant's confusion over
ownership of the vehicle and the smell was marijuana could not be used to justify the initial
stop. The Court stated,
While this [the evidence noticed after the stop] may have justified a further
inquiry of the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be
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present at the time of the stop and must be the reason for the stop. In this case,
no reasonable or articulable suspicion existed to justify the stop. (Emphasis
added).
Id at 1217. The Court then held that all of the subsequently acquired evidence had to be
suppressed.
As in Baird, there was simply no factual basis to the support the officer's hunch that
the Defendant was guilty of committing any offense, including DUL The subsequently
acquired facts relating to alcohol consumption cannot be used to justify the initial seizure of
the Defendant.
In summary, the Record in this case does not disclose that the officer in this case was
given any details relating to what Mr. Medina observed. He was told only that there was a
call on a green Ford Mustang with a specific license plate. That license plate was not the
one on the Defendant's vehicle. The officer was not even supplied with the rudimentary
information as to the reason for the call on the vehicle or other foundation necessary to
form a reasonable suspicion based upon the observations of a credible informant. Without
the observations of a credible informant to rely upon, the officer had to observe activity
that would constitute a reasonable suspicion before making the seizure. As carefully
recounted above, he did not. Based upon an absence of reasonable suspicion, either from
information garnered from a citizen informant or through his own senses, the seizure and
detention was illegal.
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POINT IV: THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION
OR AN UNLAWFUL DETENTION MANDATES SUPPRESSION OF THE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE OFFICERS.
Once the Court has determined that the seizure was improper or the detention
unreasonable, the evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed. The case law is clear
that any evidence obtained following an illegal seizure that was tainted by the illegal act
must be suppressed. State v. Small 829 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). As applied to
the facts of this case, all of the evidence against the Defendant was obtained after the illegal
seizure and detention. Accordingly, all the evidence is directly tied to the illegal stop and
must be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that many of the factual findings of the trial court are
without any basis in this case's Record. Further, as to testimony or evidence proffered, it is
submitted that this Court should give no deference to the trial court's findings because the
trial court made no determination of credibility. Second, the Appellant submits that the
facts mandate a finding that the trial court erred in concluding that the seizure of the
Defendant constituted a level I as opposed to a level II detention. Third, Appellant
contends that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify a level II encounter
with the Defendant, and as a consequence, the seizure of the Defendant was
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unconstitutional, warranting the suppression of all the evidence in this case.
Dated this(Jl day of November, 2004.
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PROFFER

3

1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(April 1, 2003)
THE JUDGE:

3

Joseph Gallagher.

Mr. Gallagher is

4

present with Mr. Petro for a hearing on a motion to

5

suppress.

6

I think it's been indicated that the Court could receive a

7

proffer.

8

then confirm it and then just include that in your memo?

And present for the city is Michael Barker.

Do you want to make the proffer on the record,

9

MR. PETRO:

10

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. PETRO:

Yes.

12

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

13
14

And

Yes.
Your memorandum?
Okay.
Why don't you make your

proffer then a n d —
MR. BARKER:

I think since you've spoken to

15

Mr. Medina if you, I trust you to do that accurately to what

16

Mr. Medina saw.

17

MR. PETRO:

Your Honor, Mr. Medina if he were

18

called to testify I think would testify as follows.

That on

19

November 27th of 2002 he was in Orem.

20

employed by UVSC.

21

traveling on 1200 South in Orem.

22

on Sandhill Road.

23

noticed, and the driving pattern may not be after Sandhill

24

Road, it may have been before.

25

Academy and he noticed that the vehicle touched the travel,

He's an electrician

He started following a vehicle that was
That vehicle turned south

He continued to follow the vehicle.

He

But he's been to the Police

1

opposite travel lanes three times and that led him to believe

2

that it was a DUI, somebody that was tired, or somebody that

3

was diabetic.

4

continued up Sandhill Road.

5

Orem.

6

was a souped up 5.0 Mustang and so it kind of pulled away

7

from him.

8

person that had been driving it was already out of the

9

vehicle, they were wearing white shorts, appeared to be tall

10

It was still in Utah, or in

And it pulled in front of a residence.

The vehicle

When he got up to where the vehicle was the

The dispatch memorandum incorrectly lists the plate
number because Mr. ... Strike that.
The plate name that Mr. Medina called in was

13
14

It

and went into a residence.

11
12

And so he followed the vehicle.

858XYL.
He also, Mr. Medina I think when he called in he

15
16

incorrectly indicated that he was on 2000 North Geneva

17

Road.

18

understanding.

21
22
23

He had Sandhill—

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

19
20

He was actually on 2000 North Sandhill Road is my

South sand, south Sandhill

Road.
MR. PETRO:

Yes.

He had Geneva Road and Sandhill

Road confused.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Well does the numbering

24

change on Sandhill Road when it gets to the county.

25

ever get to the county?

Does it

MR. PETRO:

1
2

2000 South right there.

3

MR. BARKER:

4

MR. PETRO:

5

It does, well it does just south of

Okay.
That would be correct.

It would be on

the south.

6

MR. BARKER:

Okay.

7

MR. PETRO:

South side of Sandhill and I think if

8

Mr. Medina were called to testify that's what he would

9

testify to.

10

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. PETRO:

12

Okay.
Is there any clarification of that,

Mr. Medina?

13

MR. MEDINA?:

Well the Sandhill, the Sandhill Road

14

part, the only time he hit Sandhill Road was when he came off

15

Geneva Road to go towards, eastbound towards Sandhill Road.

16
17

MR. BARKER?:

So the original sighting was on

Geneva Road?

18

MR. MEDINA?:

The original, the original sighting

19

was on Geneva Road in front of MATC that's owned by the

20

school.

21

MR. PETRO:

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. MEDINA?:

Okay.
Okay.

Got ya.

Went through University Parkway light

24

which is on Geneva Road.

25

was going to head to Provo because Geneva, Geneva Road will

Kept on heading southbound like he

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 5

1

take you to Provo.

2

Geneva Road that goes over three sets of railroad tracks, and

3

then it will hit Sandhill Road, then come to a four-way

4

stop.

5

four-way stop which takes you up to Columbia Land which is on

6

the border of Provo and Orem.

But there's a road that heads left from

And then if you go a little further there's another

MR. PETRO:
THE JUDGE:
9
10

All right.

I'll accept the proffer

and you can include that in the memoranda.
Mr. Medina.

And we'll excuse

Thank you for being here.

11

MR. BARKER:

12

MR. MEDINA?:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

That makes sense.

Thank you.
Thanks.
Then with respect to Officer Lorenski

(phonetic)?

15

MR. PETRO:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. PETRO:

I think I can proffer.
Okay.
Officer Lorenski (phonetic), the

18

dispatch memo indicates that the call was on a green Ford

19

Mustang and it had a specific plate number.

20

(phonetic) was, his understanding was dispatch, he received a

21

dispatch information was that it was just for a green Ford

22

Mustang, didn't list a plate number, and I don't believe that

23

it indicated when he got the dispatch call that it was in any

24

particular area in Orem, it was just in Orem.

25

Officer Lorenski

He was driving eastbound on 12 or 1300 South

1

University Parkway and noticed a green Mustang that was

2

parked in the parking lot right in front of the Outback

3

Steakhouse.

4

THE JUDGE:

5

MR. PETRO:

Okay.
He turned his spotlight on the rear

6

of the car, got out of his vehicle, walked up to the driver's

7

side window where Mr. Gallagher was seated.

8

up to the the window Mr. Gallagher noticed him.

9

Mr. Gallagher rolled down the the window and Officer Lorenski

10

(phonetic) spelled the odor of school and asked Mr. Gallagher

11

to get out and do the field sobriety tests.
THE JUDGE:

12
13

Okay.

And when he got

Did, what was, did he write

down, did he, is the p l a t e —
MR. BARKER:

14

Let me clarify.

Wasn't the original

15

dispatch that you had received that it was the driver was

16

possibly eastbound on University Parkway?

17

what you note in your, in your report.

18

OFFICER LORENSKI?:

19

The first sentence

there, traveling on east University Parkway.
THE JUDGE:

20
21

Yes.

Because that's

Okay.

So let's include that in the

statement.
MR. BARKER:

22

Yes.

And then the other, the other

23

clarify case I'd like is that, is to how you parked behind

24

the green Mustang.

25

off?

Did you block it off, you know, T it

Did you go nose or tail or a n y —

rnriRT PRnrFFnTMr,Q

1

OFFICER LORENSKI?:

Just from behind.

2

MR. BARKER:

3

it was I guess is ultimately—

Could it have backed out from where

OFFICER LORENSKI?:

4

No, it would have ran into

5

me.

But it had access to pull forward.

6

toward the north area of the parking lot, north.

7

THE JUDGE:

8

OFFICER LORENSKI?:

9

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. PETRO:

12

disputes that.

13

forward.

All right.
Yes.

MR. BARKER:

Ultimately what was the plate number

Ultimately Mr. Gallagher's plate is,

let's see that.

18

MR. PETRO:

19

MR. BARKER:

It was completely dissimilar.
It is 795LZN.

MR. GALLAGHER?:

22

MR. BARKER:

23

THE JUDGE:

25

Is that right,

Mr. Gallagher?

21

24

And I don't think Mr. Gallagher

on the Mustang or t h e —

16

20

It was guite a ways out near

I asked him and he said he could have pulled

THE JUDGE:

14

17

Could have pulled forward.

where the gas station is.

10

15

It was, it was out

right.

YeS.
795LZN.

Okay.

Totally not even close.

And that's where you go up to that point?
MR. BARKER:

Yes.

All

THE JUDGE:

1
2

All right.

If you'll just include

that in your statement of facts.
Officer Lorenski (phonetic), you're not here for

3
4

the other hearing are you, Mr. Walters?

5

then.

6
7
8
9

Thank you for being here.
MR. PETRO:

THE JUDGE:

11

THE JUDGE:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Yes, sir.

Three weeks?

enough time?
MR. PETRO:

13

May I have just a couple of weeks to

file that, Judge?

10

12

We'll excuse you

That's more than enough.
Okay.

That will be fine.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT B * ^ ^ feJjR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT

Z:a JJLUR P12--58
CITY OF OREM,

FINDINGS AND ORDER
ON OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff
v.

EDWARD GALLAGHER,

Case No. 025210049
JUDGE JOHN C BACKLUND

Defendant.

THE COURT , having reviewed Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence hereby
DENIES the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence on the basis that any and all seizures,
searches, and or arrests conducted by the City on the date in question where properly performed
pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Court having found the City's
witnesses extremely credible makes the following findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about November 28, 2002, at about 23:30 hours, Officer Warenski was on
routine patrol when he dispatched of a possible Green, Ford Mustang traveling
eastbound on University Parkway in Orem, Utah.

2.

Officer Warenski was traveling east on University Parkway and had past State
Street. He was unable to locate the vehicle while he traveled to 800 East University
Parkway. He circled around and headed back west on University Parkway.

3.

Officer Warenski, crossed State Street and then observed a Green Ford Mustang

parked in the northern part of Outback Steakhouse, located at 372 East University
Avenue.
4.

Officer Warenski advised dispatch he located a green, Ford Mustang that matched
the description and entered the parking lot of Outback Steakhouse.

5.

Officer Warenski pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his "take down lights"
and shined it toward the vehicle for officer safety reasons.

6.

Officer Warenski approached the vehicle and observed a male subject roll down his
drives side window.

7.

Officer Warenski leaned over and immediately smelled an odor of alcohol emanating
from the vehicle.

8.

The Officer then asked for the driver's drivers license, and he produced a California
drivers license that identified the male subject as Edward Joseph Gallagher.

9.

Officer Warenski related to Mr. Gallagher he was checking on him due to a recent
report of a green, Ford Mustang that was possibly driving under the influence.

10.

Mr. Gallagher indicated to Officer Warenski he had consumed three or four beers
about a half hour ago at the Outback Steakhouse.

11.

Officer Warenski noted Mr. Gallagher's vehicle was running and observed the
interior gauges to be turned on.

12.

Officer Warenski requested Mr. Gallagher to submit to field sobriety tests, which he
failed, and ultimately blew a .193 B.A.C. on an intoxilizer. Mr. Gallagher was
arrested for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
L

That a level one stop u is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an
officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time. State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765,
767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). A seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment
does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street
and questions him, if the person is willing to listen. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984,986
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Such consensual, voluntary discussions between citizens and
police officers are not seizures subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Id at 986.

2.

That a level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
occurs when the officer "by means of physical farce or show of authority has some
way restrained the liberty" of a person. Id at 986; See United States v. Menden hall
446 U.S. 544, 552 100S. Ct. 1870,1876(1980). "When a reasonable person, based
on the totality of circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the
officers investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs.
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The test for when the
seizure occurs is objective and depends on when the person reasonably feels
detained, not on when the police officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave.
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774.786 (Utah 1991); accord Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544,
100 S. Ct. at 1877; Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767.

3.

That circumstances, when considered in light of all other circumstances, tend to
indicate a seizure has occurred, which were first dictated by Mendenhall; "the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officers,

physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d at 986; State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (quoting Mendenhall 446
U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. at 1877).
4.

That Based upon Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990);
LavtonCitvv. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965,967 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Deitman,
739 P.2d at 617 (Utah 1987); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App.
1990);

State v. Justeseiu 47 P.3d 936 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), and the facts as

applied to this encounter, was a level one stop.
5.

That this court having found the City's witnesses credible relies on the facts
presented by preferred evidence and finds that Officer Warenski was dispatched that
a green, Ford Mustang traveling east bound on University Parkway was possibly
D.U.I. Officer Warenski, was on University Parkway, going eastbound. He traveled
to 800 East on University Parkway, but failed to see the vehicle. He doubled back
and just as he crossed State Street in Orem, he observed in the north-end of the
parking lot of Outback Steak house a green, Ford Mustang. He pulled into the
parking lot. He observed the license plate on the Green Mustang differed from that
of the license plate given by dispatch. The parking lot was marked with parking stall
slots. While in the parking lot, the defendant had pulled through one of the parking
stalls and parked in the stall so as to allow his car to pull straight out without any
obstruction as he exited the parking stall, rather than have to back-up to exit the
parking stalls. Officer Warenski pulled in behind the defendant and turned his ''take
down" (spot light) on to illuminate the area for Officers safety. Officer Warenski

was parked so as to not block in the defendant. Officer Warenski noted that the
defendant could have pulled forward, without obstruction, and clearly exited the
parking lot. The Officer approached the defendant and the male driver rolled down
his driver's side widow. The officer leaned over and immediately smelled a strong
odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. The officer then asked for a driver
license, which was provided and identified the driver as Edward Joseph Gallagher.
The driver indicated he had consumed some alcohol and Officer Warenski asked him
to submit to field sobriety test, which the defendant performed poorly and arrested
for D.U.I.
That in response to search for a the vehicle, Officer Warenski was the only officer
present at the scene. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. He used no lights or sirens,
except for his take-down lights and the use of take-down lights to illuminate the area
is not a show of authority. State v. Justesen, 47 P.3d 936, 939 (Utah Ct. App.
2002). The officer did not call out to the defendant or tell him he must stay. State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. Office Warenski did not display his weapon, nor did he
touch, restrain, or threaten the defendant. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. The
defendant voluntarily rolled down his window and the Officer merely asked for
identification. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. Thus, the fact pattern of this case is
level one encounter.
That the case of State v. Cerillo, 114 Wn App. 259 54 P.3d 1250 (Wash. App. 3
Div. 2002) is inapplicable to the Mendenhall factors based upon the facts that the
State of Washington conceded in their appellate brief the stop did not support a Level
One stop under Terry, so the Court of Appeals analyzed the first initial stop under

another warrantless exception as argued by the State; that being the "community
caretaker function." This exception does not qualify under the holdings of Terry
because for a proper Terry analysis, the Court must decide if the stop or seizure, did
or did not occur, by applying the Mendenhall factors as adopted in State v. Trujillo,
739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
8.

The fact that the officer was investigating a possible crime is inapplicable for a level
two Terry analysis to determine 'seizure' as illustrated by Deitman (officers
responded to a burglar alarm and followed a truck he observed pull away from the
scene), Jackson (officer observed a vehicle that matched a description of a vehicle
wanted in a robbery) , Maestas (two separate citizens informed an officer that an
intoxicated person was at a nearby store asking for directions to the Utah State Liquor
store, and provided the officer a description of that person's vehicle ), and Bean
(deputy heard a radio broadcast that police were looking for two male suspects in the
area and the deputy observed the defendant and his companion walking. The deputy
stopped his car and approached them). These cases all held the encounter with the
defendant's were all level one stops under Terry.

9.

Therefore, this Court finds

the witnesses testimony credible and denies the

defendant's motion to dismiss. This court finds that the State has established a prima
facia case to submit this case to a finder of fact and any and all seizures, searches,
and or arrests conducted by the City on the date in question where properly
performed pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
6

CONCLUSION
Therefore, based upon the foregoing legal points and authorities this Court respectfully denies
the defendant's motion to suppress any and all seizures, searches, and or arrests conducted by the
City on the date in question, and that any and all seizures, searches, and or arrests where properly
performed pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Court finds the City's witnesses credible
and believable. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence v/hen viewed in light most favorable
to the State the State has established a prima facia case that the defendant did commit the alleged
criminal charges. Thus this case may be submitted to a finder of fact.

ORDER
The Court, after hearing the Defendant's Motion Suppress and the City' s motion in Obj ection
to the Motion to Suppress, hereby denies the Defendant's Motion pursuant to the facts and points
of law cited in the City's motion in objection. IT IS SO ORDERED.

7

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On the 1 ^ day of W\x\\J
, 2003,1 mailed/faxed a copy of this motion and order
to the defendant's attorney and the defendant to:
MICHEALJ. PETRO
Attorney's for the Defendant
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 801-379-0700
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